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The Constitutionality of Laws Banning Physician
Assisted Suicide
Richard S. Myers*
I. I NTRODUCTION 1
The United States Supreme Court seemed to have settled the
constitutionality of laws banning physician assisted suicide in its 1997
decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg 2 and Vacco v. Quill. 3 Obergefell v. Hodges, 4 the Court’s same-sex marriage decision, has, however, raised concerns that the Court might be prepared to revisit
Glucksberg and Quill. 5 Obergefell reaffirmed the Court’s commitment to an expansive understanding of substantive due process, and
suggests that the Court, if given an opportunity, will overrule Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, although this is not inevitable. 6
In considering this issue, though, it is important to revisit decisions from several decades ago when courts allowed patients to withdraw medical treatment, even when the withdrawal was intended to
shorten the life of the patient. These cases typically claimed that they
were not approving a right to die or a right to assisted suicide. But
these decisions rejected the sanctity-of-life ethic that had long been a
part of our law and also emphasized the radical autonomy perspective
that the Supreme Court has relied upon in substantive due process
* Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. This article is an expanded version of a talk presented on October 14, 2016 at a symposium on assisted suicide held at J. Reuben Clark Law
School, Brigham Young University.
1. This article draws from several previously published articles of mine. See Richard S.
Myers, Obergefell and the Future of Substantive Due Process, 14 AVE MARIA L. REV. 54
(2016) [hereinafter Myers, Obergefell]; Richard S. Myers, Re-reading Roe v. Wade, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1025 (2014) [hereinafter Myers, Roe]; Richard S. Myers, Pope John Paul II,
Freedom, and Constitutional Law, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 61 (2007); Richard S. Myers, The
End of Substantive Due Process?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (1988) [hereinafter Myers,
Due Process]. To avoid multiplying footnotes, I will not always indicate when I have drawn
from these articles.
2. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
3. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
4. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
5. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 65–70.
6. Id.
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cases such as Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 7 Lawrence v. Texas, 8 and Obergefell v. Hodges. 9

These withdrawal-of-treatment cases preserved a line between
passive and active measures to terminate the life of patients, and so
the decisions did not approve physician assisted suicide or euthanasia.
But the distinctions the courts drew were more practical than logical.
There is a very thin line between many of these withdrawal-oftreatment cases and a right to assisted suicide.
Since 1997, when the Court rejected constitutional challenges to
laws banning assisted suicide, there has been a slow but discernible
move in favor of assisted suicide. This is certainly true in some foreign countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada. This is
also true in the United States, where assisted suicide is now legal in
several states, including importantly California. Other cultural trends
also favor the legalization of assisted suicide. I think the Supreme
Court, if given an opportunity, will rely on these developments and
Obergefell’s reaffirmation of the autonomy perspective and strike
down state laws banning physician assisted suicide.
This is by no means inevitable. Those who oppose physician assisted suicide still have an opportunity to express their views in the
democratic process and to help rebuild cultural support for the sanctity of life perspective.

II. L EGAL B ACKGROUND
As noted above, the constitutionality of laws banning physician
assisted suicide seems to have been settled by the Court’s 1997 decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. In those cases, the Court rejected the idea that there is a fundamental right to assisted suicide. 10 In so doing, the Court refused to rely on the radical
7. 505 U.S. 833, 846–53 (1992). For commentary on Casey, see Richard S. Myers, Reflections on the Twentieth Anniversary of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in LIFE AND

LEARNING XXII: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR
LIFE
CONFERENCE
(Joseph
W.
Koterski,
ed.)
(forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150241. See also Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003).
8. 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003).
9. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
10. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). In Vacco v. Quill, the Court
rejected an equal protection argument. The Court agreed that there is a difference between
letting a patient die (by refusing life-saving medical treatment) and killing a patient (by assisting
in the patient’s suicide). According to the Court, “[l]ogic and contemporary practice support
New York’s judgment that the two acts are different, and New York may therefore, consistent
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autonomy perspective articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 11 and instead inquired whether there
was any support for the view that a right to assisted suicide was deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition. The Court carefully
reviewed the relevant history and stated:
[W]e are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent
adults. To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centuries
of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy
choice of almost every State. 12

In Glucksberg, unlike in Roe v. Wade 13 or in Obergefell v. Hodges,
the Court was unwilling to take that step.
The Glucksberg Court’s approach to substantive due process became the governing standard, despite the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. 14 The Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges seems
to change this. In supporting same-sex marriage, the Obergefell
Court principally relied on the doctrine of substantive due process. 15
The Court rejected Glucksberg’s historical approach to substantive
due process and relied rather on its own understanding of the nature
of liberty. This understanding emphasizes respect for individual autonomy and self-determination and choice, at least when the conduct

with the Constitution, treat them differently. By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical treatment[,] while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law follows a
longstanding and rational distinction.” 521 U.S. at 808.
11. In Casey, the joint opinion stated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. One commentator fairly stated that the Court had adopted the view that
moral relativism was a constitutional command. See Steven Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND. L. J. 331 (1995). Gey stated: “[T]he typical focus on the mechanics of Casey and Roe has unfortunately overshadowed the fact that a very conservative Supreme
Court has strongly reaffirmed the principle that moral autonomy is the philosophical basis for
the constitutional privacy right.” Id. at 363.
12. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For commentary on Roe, see Myers, Roe, supra note 1.
14. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lawrence seemed to revive the broader, more expansive approach to substantive due process. The Court relied upon the “mystery passage” from Casey
and extolled the idea of moral autonomy. The Lawrence Court did not even cite Glucksberg.
Yet, despite all of this, Glucksberg, with its emphasis on history and tradition, seemed to remain the dominant approach to substantive due process. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at
60–61 (discussing this point).
15. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). The Court did cite both due
process and equal protection, yet it seems clear that liberty and autonomy are doing most of the
work. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 61 n. 52.
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involved, the Court said, “the rights of two consenting adults whose
marriage[] would pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.” 16 The dissenters complained, with some justification, that the
Court had effectively overruled Glucksberg’s approach to substantive
due process. 17
Obergefell seems to be an effort to cement the Court’s broad approach to substantive due process. The Court’s analysis was unconstrained by history or a careful description of the right or even an assessment of emerging trends. The Court’s focus was more on its own
reflections on the nature of liberty and its own discernment of new
insights and societal understandings about “what freedom is and must
become.” 18 The Court’s understanding is an endorsement of the “autonomy of self” the Court celebrated in Lawrence 19 and of the “mystery passage” of Casey. 20 The Court seems to have concluded that
while “[t]he [Fourteenth] Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics[],” 21 it does enact John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. 22
It is not clear where this will lead. There has been much speculation about Obergefell’s potential impact on issues such as polygamy. 23
My focus here is on Obergefell’s potential impact on cases challenging state laws banning assisted suicide. Since Obergefell, there have
been a couple of state court decisions discussing the constitutionality
of laws banning assisted suicide. In Morris v. Brandenburg, 24 the Su16. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.
17. Chief Justice Roberts stated: “[T]he majority’s position requires it to effectively
overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of substantive due process.”
Id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 2603.
19. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
20. See supra note 11.
21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled in
part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
22. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent stated “the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty any more than it enacts Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). This comparison is a staple in the literature.
See Myers, Due Process, supra note 1, at 604, n. 278.
23. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 55 n. 5, 64–65.
24. Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836 (N.M. 2016). In Morris, the trial court had
legalized assisted suicide in an opinion that rested on the autonomy rationale. The New Mexico
Court of Appeals reversed this decision by a 2-1 vote. 356 P.3d 564 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015). The
two judges in the majority thought, rather implausibly, that Obergefell had endorsed Glucksberg. For discussion of this point, see Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 67 n. 104. The dissent
thought that Glucksberg had been effectively overruled. The dissent thought it was most appropriate to adopt “the view of liberty, autonomy, and privacy elucidated in the Ca-

398

MYERS.MACRO.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

395]

4/26/2017 8:36 PM

Assisted Suicide, Constitutional Issues

preme Court of New Mexico upheld the constitutionality of a law
banning assisted suicide. In Myers v. Scheiderman, 25 an intermediate
appellate court in New York did the same thing. Although both decisions were based on state constitutional law, Glucksberg had a significant effect on both opinions. The courts seemed influenced by the
longstanding and still largely persisting tradition in the law opposing
assisted suicide. Both courts emphasized the need for judicial restraint. 26
These state court decisions are important but I do not think they
tell us much about how the United States Supreme Court will approach the issue if afforded an opportunity. I think we are witnessing
the same sort of reaction that we saw in the lower courts after Casey
and Lawrence. After these decisions, lower courts were, for the most
part, rather cautious about expanding the scope of substantive due
process. 27 These courts seemed inclined to let the United States Supreme Court extend the reasoning of those cases into new areas. I
think that the Supreme Court will be all too willing to do just that if
it is given an opportunity to revisit Glucksberg. 28
In so doing, I think the Court will emphasize the “autonomy of
self” philosophy and conclude that ending one’s own life is the ultimate act of self-determination. 29 The Court will also likely reject the
state’s interest in preserving life because it will likely conclude that it
violates autonomy to second-guess an individual’s own subjective assessment of the value of her life. 30
The Court will likely emphasize the slow but discernible trend in
favor of assisted suicide. 31 At the time of Glucksberg, physician assist-

sey/Lawrence/Obergefell line of cases” and found that under this approach the New Mexico
law was unconstitutional. Morris, 356 P.3d at 601 (Vanzi, J., dissenting).
25. Myers v. Schneiderman, 31 N.Y.S.3d 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
26. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 67–68 (discussing these opinions). As I have
explored, there are real benefits to courts exercising judicial humility on issues of this complexity and importance. See Richard S. Myers, The Virtue of Judicial Humility, 13 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 207 (2015) [hereinafter Myers, Virtue].
27. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 57–61.
28. See id. at 65–70.
29. Id. at 68.
30. Id.
31. In defining the scope of substantive due process, the Court sometimes relies upon its
assessments of social trends. For example, in Lawrence, the Court emphasized that its analysis
of recent history demonstrated “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
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ed suicide had not yet been legalized in any state in the country. 32
Physician assisted suicide is now legal in Oregon, Washington, Vermont, Montana, California, Colorado, and Washington, D.C.. 33 International trends have also moved in favor of assisted suicide. The
countries leading the way (the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada)
were the same countries that led the way in legalizing same-sex marriage. 34 I should note that these developments in the states and in
other countries have not moved in a straight line. Some states have
rejected proposals to legalize assisted suicide or have strengthened
laws banning assisted suicide. 35 And certain countries have rejected
efforts to legalize assisted suicide. 36 There is, though, a slow trend in
favor of legalization. Moreover, public opinion seems to be moving in
favor of assisted suicide in the last few years, after a long period of
relative stability on the issue. 37

III. W ITHDRAWAL C ASES
If the Court revisits the constitutionality of laws banning assisted
suicide, older decisions such as Bouvia 38 (in California), Brophy 39 (in
32. Oregon’s law did not go into effect until October of 1997, several months after

Glucksberg was decided.
33. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 66 (noting state developments in Oregon,

Washington, Vermont, Montana, and California). Colorado legalized assisted suicide in the
November 2016 election. Jennifer Brown, Colorado Passes Medical Aid in Dying, Joining 5
Other States, DENV. POST (Nov. 9, 2016, 11:40 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/
11/08/colorado-aid-in-dying-proposition-106-election-results/. The District of Columbia City
Council has also legalized assisted suicide, which is now in effect. Micaiah Bilger, Washington
D.C. Becomes 6th Place in the U.S. to Legalize Assisted Suicide, LIFE NEWS, (Feb. 20, 2017,
11:05 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/2017/02/20/washington-d-c-becomes-6th-place-in-theu-s-to-legalize-assisted-suicide/.
34. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 65–66.
35. See, e.g., Wesley J. Smith, Ohio Making Assisted Suicide a Felony, THE CORNER
(Dec. 12, 2016, 9:50 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/442967/ohio-makingassisted-suicide-felony (noting that Ohio made assisted suicide a felony in December 2016).
36. South Australia rejected an effort to legalize assisted suicide in November of 2016,
Michael Cook, Assisted Suicide Narrowly Defeated in South Australia, NRL NEWS TODAY
(Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/news/2016/11/assisted-suicidenarrowly-defeated-in-south-australia/#.WFRO8vwizIU. And, on December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court of Appeals of South Africa rejected a constitutional challenge to the law banning
assisted suicide. Richard Myers, Supreme Court of South Africa Rejects Lower Court Decision
Allowing Assisted Suicide/Euthanasia, UNIV. FACULTY FOR LIFE BLOG (Dec. 12, 2016, 11:52
AM), http://www.uffl.org/blog/2016/12/12/supreme-court-of-south-africa-rejects-lower-courtdecision-allowing-assisted-suicideeuthanasia/.
37. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 66 (noting polling data).
38. See Bouvia v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In
Bouvia, the court permitted Elizabeth Bouvia, a competent, 28 year-old quadriplegic with se-
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Massachusetts), Browning 40 (in Florida), and Bland 41 (in England),
will also likely prove important. The withdrawal of treatment area is
complicated and I should hasten to add there are many cases when
the withdrawal of treatment is appropriate. 42 But the cases involving
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration are particularly troublesome, although in certain instances the withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration is permissible. 43
vere disabilities, to withdraw the food and water that were sustaining her life. The appellate
court faulted the lower court for failing to give appropriate weight to the quality of her life.
The appellate court endorsed the idea that it had to respect her view that “the quality of her life
has been diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration.
She, as the patient, lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her existence
meaningless. She can’t be faulted for so concluding. Id. at 1142. The court further noted that it
had to respect Bouvia’s choice to consider that her “life has been physically destroyed and its
quality, dignity and purpose gone . . . .” Id. at 1143.
39. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). In
Brophy, the court allowed Paul Brophy’s guardian to permit the withdrawal of artificially administered nutrition and hydration. Brophy had been diagnosed as in a persistent vegetative
state and had previously expressed his desire not to be maintained in such a condition. The
court emphasized the importance of individual autonomy, even when the individual’s choice
would be exercised by another through substituted judgment. The state’s interest in preserving
life was not weighty enough to override the choice to continue treatment.
40. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990). In Browning, the
court considered the following question: “Whether the guardian of a patient who is incompetent but not in a permanent vegetative state and who suffers from an incurable but not terminal
condition, may exercise the patient’s right of self-determination to forego sustenance provided
artificially by a nasogastric tube?” Id. at 7–8. The court largely endorsed this view. The court
rejected the state interests that were claimed to outweigh the right to forego treatment. The
state’s interest in preserving life was insufficient, primarily because Browning’s affliction was
not curable and the state’s only interest was in briefly maintaining her life. The state’s interest
in preventing suicide was not implicated, the court stated, because “the discontinuation of life
support ‘in fact will merely result in [her] death, if at all, from natural causes.’” Id. at 14.
41. See Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789. Bland involved a patient who had
been diagnosed in a persistent vegetative state. Bland’s family and his attending physicians
sought permission to withdraw artificially administered food and water, which was ultimately
granted by the House of Lords. For commentary on Bland, see J.M. Finnis, Bland: Crossing the
Rubicon?, 109 LAW. Q. REV. 329 (1993); John Keown, The Legal Revolution: From “Sanctity
of Life” to “Quality of Life” and “Autonomy,” 14 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 253 (1997–
1998).
42. For discussion of this issue, see WILLIAM E. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS AND THE
GIFT OF HUMAN LIFE 277–85 (2d. ed. 2008) (explaining the distinction between ordinary
(proportionate) and extraordinary (disproportionate) treatments). May explains that one “can
refuse a treatment. . .without adopting by choice a proposal to kill himself or herself. The
treatment refusal is based on the judgment that the treatment itself, or its side effects or deleterious consequences, are so burdensome that undergoing the treatment is not morally obligatory. The treatment in question is truly ‘extraordinary/disproportionate’ since the burdens it imposes far exceeds the benefits likely to result from its use.” Id. at 282. In making this judgment,
“[o]ne does not judge a life excessively burdensome; one judges a treatment excessively burdensome.” Id. at 283; see also Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note 41, at 238–39.
43. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS, supra note 41, at 285–302. See John S. Howland &
Peter J. Gummere, Challenging Common Practice in Advanced Dementia Care: A Fresh Look
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In these cases, the courts often adopted the autonomy perspective
that later surfaced in Casey and Obergefell. In Brophy, which involved the withdrawal of food and water from a patient in a persistent
vegetative state, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts relied
on “the right of self-determination and individual autonomy” 44 and in
so doing specifically relied upon John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. 45 In
Browning, which involved the withdrawal of food and water from a
severely disabled patient, the Florida Supreme Court found that the
“fundamental right of self-determination, commonly expressed as the
right of privacy, controls this case.” 46 In Bouvia, the concurring opinion thought the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration was permissible even if understood as a suicide, which the concurrence thought
was in fact at stake. 47 The concurrence echoed the majority’s view
that “a desire to terminate one’s life is probably the ultimate exercise
of one’s right to privacy” 48 and stated that
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own
destinies so long as the rights of others are not affected. That right
should, in my opinion, include the ability to enlist the assistance of
others, including the medical profession, in making death as painless and quick as possible. 49

This celebration of autonomy, even the autonomy to make lethal
choices, is (as this concurrence makes clear) paving the way to the acceptance of more active steps to terminate life. Embedding the autonomy rationale in the law is dangerous, as cases from two decades
ago make clear. Prior to Glucksberg, several courts relied on the extreme autonomy rationale in Casey to support the view that there exat Assisted Nutrition and Hydration, 14 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 53 (2014) (discussing the

moral issues relating to assisted nutrition and hydration with a particular focus on patients with
dementia).
44. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 633.
45. Id. The court stated: “The right of self-determination and individual autonomy has
its roots deep in our history. John Stuart Mill stated the concept succinctly: ‘[T]he only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be
wise, or even right.’” (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 271 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952)).
46. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1990).
47. Bouvia v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1146–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(Compton, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 1144.
49. Id. at 1147 (Compton, J., concurring).
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isted a fundamental right to die. 50 The most prominent example was
the Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Glucksberg, 51 which was written by Judge Reinhardt, who is often a cultural bellwether on social
issues. 52 Now with Obergefell, 53 it seems likely that the Court will
push the autonomy logic of the withdrawal cases to permit physician
assisted suicide.
These cases also reject the idea that the state’s interest in preserving life can override the patient’s autonomy. In fact, autonomy does
double duty here. In evaluating the state’s interest in life, the courts
emphasize that they must defer to the patient’s subjective assessment
of the value of her life. 54 The courts claim that they are not adopting
a quality of life approach, 55 but I don’t think there is any other way to
read the opinions. In commenting on the Bland case, Peter Singer
stated that the case marked the collapse of the traditional, sanctity-of50. See Richard S. Myers, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Laws Banning Assisted
Suicide from the Perspective of Catholic Moral Teaching, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 771,

778–79 (1995) (discussing these cases).
51. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F. 3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
After quoting the mystery passage from Casey, Judge Reinhardt stated: “The district judge in
this case found the Court’s reasoning in Casey ‘highly instructive’ and ‘almost prescriptive’ for
determining ‘what liberty interest may inhere in a terminally ill person’s choice to commit suicide.’ Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459. We agree.” Id. at 813.
52. See Myers, Virtue, supra note 26, at 208–09 (making this point about Judge Reinhardt).
53. These withdrawal of treatment decisions were decided before Glucksberg and the
Court in Glucksberg and Quill rejected the idea that these decisions could be extended to support a right to assisted suicide. The Court in 1997 though seemed keen to issue a restrained
ruling, perhaps in the wake of Casey and the Court’s abortion decisions. Myers, Roe, supra note
1, at 1043. Obergefell seems to indicate an increased willingness on the part of the Court to
venture into new territories (i.e., to find new constitutional rights). This new willingness creates
the risk that the Court will seize on the principle of autonomy embedded on the law since at
least the 1980s.
54. See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1142–43.
55. In Brophy, the court stated: “[W]e make no judgment based on our own view of the
value of Brophy’s life, since we do not approve of an analysis of State interests which focuses on
Brophy’s quality of life. The judge correctly disavowed pronouncing judgment that Brophy’s
life is not worth preserving.” Brophy v. New England Siani Hosp. In., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635
(Mass. 1986) (citations omitted). Justice O’Connor’s dissent thought that the majority had indeed relied on quality of life concerns. Justice O’Connor stated: “Even in cases involving severe
and enduring illness, disability and ‘helplessness,’ society’s focus must be on life, not death, with
dignity. By its very nature, every human life, without reference to its condition, has a value that
no one rightfully can deny or measure. Recognition of that truth is the cornerstone on which
American law is built. Society’s acceptance of that fundamental principle explains why, from
time immemorial, society through law has extended its protection to all, including, especially,
its weakest and most vulnerable members. The court’s implicit, if not explicit, declaration that
not every human life has sufficient value to be worthy of the State’s protection denies the dignity of all human life, and undermines the very principle on which American law is constructed.”
497 N.E.2d at 646 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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life ethic. 56 John Keown has noted that although Singer’s comment
may be overstated, the Bland court did deal a blow to the sanctity-oflife principle that might prove fatal. 57
The courts refer to severely disabled patients as having “bare existence” 58 or “mere corporeal existence.” 59 In fact, in Brophy, the
court said the “burden of maintaining the corporeal existence degrades the very humanity it was meant to serve.” 60 It is necessary, the
courts say, to defer to the patient’s judgment that his life is “degrading and without human dignity” 61 or “meaningless.” 62 In Bland, the
judges stated that there was no benefit to keeping Tony Bland alive. 63
They treated him as already dead. 64 Because he lacked certain cognitive abilities, he was effectively a non-person. One of the judges described Bland’s condition in this way: “his body is alive, but he has no
life in the sense that even the most pitifully handicapped but con-

56. PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR
TRADITIONAL ETHICS 73 (1994).
57. Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note 41, at 255. Keown’s paper contains a good account of the sanctity of life principle and of the reasons for the prohibition of intentional killing
an innocent human being. Id. at 256–61.
58. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990).
59. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 636.
62. Bouvia v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
63. See Finnis, supra note 41, at 333 (“The judges in Bland proceed, of course, on the
basis that the responsible physician no longer had any duty to prevent Bland’s death. His death
would be for him no harm or loss. Or as they put it, neither continued life nor the measures
necessary to keep him alive were of any benefit to him, or in his best interests.”). Another way
to express this is to say that these patients would be better off dead. One leading academic proponent of physician assisted suicide states that “many treatment withdrawals reflect an intent to
die. Patients often refuse life-sustaining treatment because they perceive their life as burdensome and therefore want to die.” David Orentlicher, The Alleged Distinction Between Eutha-

nasia and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Conceptually Incoherent and Impossible to Maintain, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 837. at 846. According to this scholar, these choices are

morally justified because “when life becomes sufficiently miserable, a person can reasonably
believe that continued life is worse than death.” Id. at 851–52. This is, as this scholar quite candidly notes, an acceptance of the view that the lives of such patients are “no longer worth living,” David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest Revolution, 38 B. C. L. REV. 443, 465 (1997), and that they “would be better off dead” Orentlicher,
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. at 852.
64. In Brophy, Paul Brophy’s wife had decided that “her husband’s ‘life is over[.]’” 497
N.E.2d at 632. One commentator noted: “But there can be no valid interest in preserving life
when there is no life left to preserve. A ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications by a
terminally ill person to hasten that person’s inevitable death does not advance any conceivable
interest in preserving life.” Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on “Assisted
Suicide”: The View from Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 777, 790 (1994).
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scious human being has a life”; 65 Bland’s existence was a “humiliation.” 66 Justice Stevens said basically the same thing in his Cruzan
dissent when he noted that
Nancy Cruzan is obviously ‘alive’ in a physiological sense. But for
patients like Nancy Cruzan, who have no consciousness and no
chance of recovery, there is a serious question as to whether the
mere persistence of their bodies is “life” as that word is commonly
used in both the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. 67

The key though in most of these opinions is that the courts contend
that they must respect the patient’s subjective choice to consider, as
the Bouvia court stated, that her “life has been physically destroyed
and its quality, dignity and purpose gone[.]” 68 It seems, too, that the
courts often endorse the quality of life philosophy reflected, although
the opinions typically, in the end, defer to the subjective wishes of the
patient. As one of the Brophy dissents commented, under this reasoning, “it necessarily follows that the young as well as the old, the
healthy as well as the sick, and the firm as well as the infirm, without
exception, have the right to commit suicide, and that others have the
right to participate in that act.” 69
These older withdrawal of treatment cases do, typically, say that
they are not approving a right to die or a right to suicide.70 The cases
65. Bland, supra note 41, at 850; Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note 41, at 271 (quoting this and similar descriptions).
66. Finnis, supra note 41, at 336 (the judges accept the view that “Bland’s continued existence was not merely no benefit but actually a harm to him, a source of indignity, violation of
his wish to be remembered well, humiliation). Anthony Fisher aptly commented that “[i]n
Bland’s case . . . the judges have made a radical departure from this traditional ethic and law,
allowing that tube-feeding be withdrawn not because of the futility or burdensome of the socalled treatment, but because Tony Bland’s continued life was a source of indignity and humiliation to him, a violation of how he would want to be remembered, and an ordeal for others.”;
see Anthony Fisher, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Moral and Philosophical Dilemmas in Death and
Dying, Address at the Symposium on Death and Dying (Oct. 15, 1994),
https://www.ewtn.com/library/PROLIFE/KILLET.TXT.
67. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 345 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Bouvia v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
69. Brophy, 497 N. E. 2d at 645 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
70. In Bouvia, for example, the court stated that Elizabeth’s “decision to allow nature to
take its course is not equivalent to an election to commit suicide . . . .” Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.
3d at 1144. The concurring judge thought that it was clear that Elizabeth Bouvia’s death would
be a suicide, which the judge thought should be allowed. The judge stated: “I have no doubt
that Elizabeth Bouvia wants to die, and if she had the full use of even one hand, could probably
find a way to end her life—in a word—commit suicide. In order to seek the assistance which she
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say they are not permitting active steps to terminate lives but are only
allowing passive steps (omissions) that allow nature to take its
course. 71 But in cases such as Brophy and Bland, this doesn’t seem accurate. The withdrawal of food and water (although passive, an omission) is done with the intent to end the life of the patient. A majority
of the judges in Bland explicitly stated that the withdrawal of food
and water was done with the intent to terminate Tony Bland’s life. 72
As one of the Brophy dissents stated,
Paul Brophy will die as a direct result of the cessation of feeding.
The ethical principle of double effect is totally inapplicable here.
This death by dehydration and starvation has been approved by the
court. He will not die from the aneurysm which precipitated his loss
of consciousness, the surgery which was performed, the brain damage that followed or the insertion of the G-tube. He will die as a direct result of the refusal to feed him. He will starve to death, and
the court approves his death. 73

There is a practical line here, between active and passive steps, between acts and omissions. But this has never been regarded as dispositive by the law. 74 As Justice Scalia noted in his Cruzan concurrence,
“in the prosecution of a parent for the starvation death of her infant,
it was no defense that the infant’s death was ‘caused’ by not action of
the parent but by the natural process of starvation, or by the infant’s
natural inability to provide for itself.” 75 As St. Pope John Paul II
commented, “death by starvation or dehydration is, in fact, the only
possible outcome as a result of the withdrawal [of food and water]. In

needs in ending her life by the only means she sees available—starvation—she has had to stultify her position before this court by disavowing her desire to end her life in such a fashion and
proclaiming that she will eat all that she can physically tolerate. Even the majority opinion here
must necessarily ‘dance’ around the issue. Elizabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that she prefers death to continued existence in her helpless and, to her, intolerable condition. I believe she has an absolute right to effectuate that decision. This state and the
medical profession, instead of frustrating her desire, should be attempting to relieve her suffering by permitting and in fact assisting her to die with ease and dignity. The fact that she is
forced to suffer the ordeal of self-starvation to achieve her objective is in itself inhumane.” 179
Cal. App. 3d at 1146–47 (Compton, J., concurring).
71. See Brophy, 497 N. E. 2d at 439; In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14
(Fla. 1990).
72. Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note 41, at 254 (“in the express opinion of a majority of their Lordships, the doctor’s intent was to kill.”).
73. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 442 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
74. See Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note 41, at 258.
75. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 297 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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this sense it ends up becoming, if done knowingly and willingly, true
and proper euthanasia by omission.” 76
The troubling aspect of these cases is that they accept withdrawal
even if done with the express intent to terminate a life. In cases such
as Bland and Brophy, the withdrawals are not justified because the
treatment is burdensome but because the patient’s life is a burden or
is thought to be worthless. 77
The withdrawal cases show that extreme autonomy and the quality of life ethic have been embedded in the law for some time now.
The decline of the sanctity of life ethic can be seen in other contexts
as well. The current move to increase prenatal screening for Downs
Syndrome is just one example. 78 I think this decline can also be seen
in the recent New Mexico litigation involving that state’s ban on assisted suicide. In that case, the state did not defend the law by asserting an interest in life. 79

IV. C ONCLUSION
Now, with Obergefell (reaffirming the autonomy rationale), and
with other cultural trends, it seems increasingly likely that the Court
76. See Richard S. Myers, Reflections on the Terri Schindler-Schiavo Controversy, XIV
LIFE & LEARNING 39, n.99 (quoting Pope John Paul II, “Address to the Participants in the International Congress on Life-Sustaining Treatments and the Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas” (Mar. 20, 2004)), http://www.uffl.org/Vol14/myers-04.pdf.
77. The dissents in Brophy discussed this point at some length. See Brophy, 497 N. E.
2d at 642–43 (Lynch, J., dissenting in part); Id. at 643–46 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice O’Connor, for example, emphasized that the lower court explicitly
found that the decision to withdraw food and water was not due to the burdensome of the
treatment but was rather based on the view, as Justice O’Connor put it, that “life in any event is
not worth living and its continuation is intolerable.” Id. at 644 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). In commenting on the bland case, John Keown noted that “it was
Bland’s life, and not his tube-feeding, that was adjudged worthless” Keown, Legal Revolution,
supra note 41, at 272.
78. See Robert McFarland, Life Worthy of Life: Down Syndrome, Equality, and My
Son
Silas,
THE
WITHERSPOON
INSTITUTE
(Oct.
26,
2016),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/10/18123/ for a forceful reflection on these issues.
79. The New Mexico Supreme Court emphasized three state interests in support of its
law banning assisted suicide— (1) an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession; (2) an interest in protecting vulnerable groups from abuse, neglect and mistakes; and (3)
an interest in avoiding a progression to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. The Court didn’t
rely on the state’s interest in protecting the life of the person who wanted to commit suicide,
even though that interest had been important in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. at 728–
30 (discussing the state’s interest in the preservation of life). Perhaps tellingly, the New Mexico
court described this interest in this way—”The State concedes that it does not have an interest
in preserving a painful and debilitating life that will end imminently.” Morris v. Brandenburg,
376 P.3d at 855.
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will overrule Glucksberg. In 1997, state laws and the views of establishment organizations (e.g., American Medical Association) were
largely arrayed against recognition of a right to physician assisted suicide. 80 Now, the trends seem to be moving slowly in favor of allowing
assisted suicide. Some medical associations have dropped their opposition to physician assisted suicide. 81 Even the AMA is considering
whether to take a neutral position on this issue. 82 In his dissent in
Obergefell, Justice Alito commented that the only real constraint on
the Court’s power is a majority of the Court’s “own sense of what
those with political power and cultural influence are willing to tolerate.” 83 In 1997, the Court was unwilling to extend substantive due
process to protect the right to die. But the legal and cultural situation
has changed sufficiently so that it seems likely that a majority of the
Court will be willing to extend the autonomy rationale it relied upon
in Obergefell to protect physician assisted suicide.
This is by no means inevitable. 84 Because the Court has not yet
intervened to “resolve” this controversy, 85 opponents of assisted suicide still have the opportunity to advance their views and to rebuild
the sanctity of life norm.

80. In Glucksberg, the Court noted that “the American Medical Association, like many
other medical and physicians’ groups, has concluded that ‘[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer.’” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (quoting American Medical Association, Code of Ethics section 2.211
(1994)).
81. A handbook prepared by a leading right to die group notes the importance of the
views of medical associations in influencing the debate on this issue. Medical Aid in Dying: A
Handbook for Engaging State Medical Associations, COMPASSION & CHOICES,
https://www.compassionandchoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/C-C-State-MedicalAssociation-Handbook-FINAL-8.26.16-Approved-for-Public-Distribution.pdf (last visited
2/1/17).
82. Fr. Mark Hodges, American Medical Association Approves Resolution to ‘Study’
Assisted
Suicide,
LIFE
SITE
(June
21,
2016,
9:30
PM),
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/american-medical-association-approves-resolution-tostudy-assisted-suicide.
83. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2643 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
84. Much depends on the Court’s personnel at the time the issue is considered.
85. The Court sometimes claims that its decisions “resolve” social controversies. But, as
the continuing resistance to the Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade and Casey indicate, this is not
an accurate account of the impact of the Court’s rulings. See Myers, Virtue, supra note 26, at
211 (discussing this in the context of abortion).
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